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Summary
Advocates of restrictive immigration policies often claim that immigrants impose a net burden on the
public treasury. The most comprehensive and authoritative study of the fiscal effects of immigration in
the U.S. finds, however, that there is a net positive effect. If policymakers are concerned that less skilled
immigrants may pose some risk of a fiscal burden, then restricting immigrant access to means-tested
public benefits would be a better response than denying them admission. A path to citizenship for these
immigrants need not entail a fiscal burden as long as their access to these public benefits and citizenship
is sufficiently delayed.
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Walls or Welcome Mats?
Immigration and the Public
Treasury (Part two of a two-part series)
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Howard F. Chang

As the presidential campaigns in the United States approach the Democratic and
Republican National Conventions this summer, immigration policy remains a
deeply divisive issue.
The Republican candidate Donald Trump promises
to build a border wall between the United States
and Mexico, which he claims Mexico will fund.1
He has also vowed to deport all 11 million unauthorized immigrants in the United States.2 Results
from a March 2016 survey from the Public Religion
Research Institute, however, suggest that while this
campaign rhetoric may appeal to older Republicans,
it may have limited appeal for other Americans.3 A
62-percent majority of Americans, and 63 percent of
Republicans between the ages of 18 and 29, support a
path to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants currently living here. Only 19 percent of Americans want
unauthorized immigrants deported. Half of all Americans, and a slim majority (51 percent) of Republicans
between the ages of 18 and 29, believe that immigration strengthens American society, as opposed to 34
percent of Americans and 36 percent of these young
Republicans who view immigration as a threat to
American customs and values. Thus, polling indicates
that restrictive immigration proposals do not align
with the preferences of most Americans, including
the young voters who represent the future of the
Republican Party.

SUMMARY
• Advocates of restrictive immigration policies often claim that
immigrants impose a net burden on the public treasury. The
most comprehensive and authoritative study of the fiscal effects of immigration in the U.S. finds, however, that there is a
net positive effect.
• Congress could increase the economic welfare of U.S. natives
by liberalizing our immigration restrictions. The U.S. Senate took
a step in this direction in June 2013 by passing a bipartisan
comprehensive immigration reform bill (S. 744), but the House
has failed to act on it.
• If some in Congress are concerned that less skilled immigrants
may pose some risk of a fiscal burden, then restricting immigrant access to means-tested public benefits would be a better
response than denying them admission. A path to citizenship
for these immigrants need not entail a fiscal burden as long
as their access to these public benefits and citizenship is sufficiently delayed.
• An expanded guest worker program could include a path to
citizenship through a merit-based point system like that proposed
in S. 744 for alien workers on W visas. Congress could grant
legalized immigrants a path to citizenship through the same
system. If this system gave these immigrants a realistic chance
of eventually obtaining green cards, then such a compromise
might allow comprehensive immigration reform to emerge from
Congress.
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schools, while excluding the benefits that children who are born U.S.
citizens will generate when they grow
up, start their own households, work,
and pay taxes. A proper accounting of
the total fiscal impact of immigration
would avoid this bias by including not
only the fiscal impact of each immigrant over the entire life cycle of that
immigrant but also the fiscal impact
expected from all the descendants of
that immigrant. After all, but for the
admission of the immigrant, none of
those descendants would be present.
In 1997, the National Research
Council (NRC) conducted the first
study to attempt this comprehensive
calculation of the fiscal impact of
immigration, including projections
regarding the education, income, and
fiscal effects of future generations.6
Thus, this study represents a quantum
leap in sophistication beyond any prior
study of the fiscal impact of immigrants. The NRC study remains the
most careful, thorough, and complete
analysis of the fiscal effects of immigration in the United States.
The NRC finds that the expected
net effect of the descendants of
immigrants on the public treasury is
positive. These future generations tend
to be better educated, have higher
incomes, and pay more taxes than their

As discussed in Part I of this
series, Immigration and the Labor Market (http://bit.ly/IssueBriefV4N4),
economists generally agree that
restrictive immigration proposals
would harm the U.S. economy and
deprive natives of the economic benefits of immigrant labor. In this issue
brief, Part II, I will turn to the impact
of immigration on the public sector.4
Here immigrants confer economic
benefits on U.S. natives by expanding
the tax base and paying taxes, but they
also impose costs when they receive
transfers from the public treasury or
otherwise increase the costs of public
programs. This observation raises
the question asked by the economist
George Borjas: “Do immigrants pay
their way in the welfare state?”5

THE FISCAL IMPACT OF
IMMIGRATION
Advocates of restrictive immigration
policies often claim that immigrants
impose a net burden on the public
treasury, pointing to studies that add
up the fiscal costs and fiscal benefits
currently generated by immigrantheaded households at one particular
point in time. These crude calculations include the costs imposed by
the children of immigrants on public

immigrant forebears. Taking the future
fiscal impact of these generations into
account, under the most plausible set
of assumptions, the NRC finds that
the average recent immigrant in 1996
has a positive fiscal impact of $80,000
in net present value. In fact, an
updated analysis based on more recent
data yields an even larger net benefit,
estimating that the average immigrant
in 1998 has a positive fiscal impact of
$99,000 in net present value.7
The NRC study also found that
immigrants with more education
tended to earn more income, pay more
in taxes, and be less likely to qualify
for means-tested public benefits than
those with less education. Thus, the
expected fiscal impact of any immigrant depends in part on that immigrant’s level of education: The average
immigrant with more than a highschool education has a positive fiscal
impact of $198,000 in net present
value; the average immigrant with only
a high-school education has a positive
fiscal impact of $51,000 in net present value; and the average immigrant
with less than a high-school education
has a modest negative fiscal impact of
-$13,000 in net present value.
Another characteristic that affects
an immigrant’s fiscal impact is age
at the time of entry. The younger
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the immigrant, the more years that
immigrant can spend working in the
United States, and the more taxes
that immigrant can pay prior to
retirement. Thus, the NRC finds that
even an immigrant with less than a
high-school education has a positive
expected fiscal impact if that immigrant enters the United States by the
age of 21. Thus, the fiscal impact of
immigration proves to be positive in
part because immigrants tend to arrive
as young workers.
Immigrants to the United States
often arrive as young adults who will
not participate in entitlement programs for the elderly for many years.
Young workers have the most to gain
by immigration because they can
enjoy higher wages in the U.S. labor
market over a longer period of time.
As you can see from the age distribution of immigrants compared to
natives in Figure 1, immigrants are
disproportionately of working age.
Finally, the NRC study also
reveals how the fiscal impact of
immigrants is a function of the policies applied to them. In particular, the
NRC studies the effect of restrictions on immigrant access to public
benefits. The NRC finds that the
Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of

FIGURE 1: AGE DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. IMMIGRANTS AND NATIVES, 2014
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1996 improved the fiscal impact of
the average immigrant in the United
States by $8,000 in net present value
by excluding immigrants from federal
means-tested entitlement programs
for five years after entry. This change
in the law thereby increased the net
positive impact of the average immigrant from $80,000 to $88,000 in net
present value. The NRC found that
this legislation had a positive expected
fiscal effect for immigrants with all
levels of education, regardless of the
immigrant’s age at arrival.

IMPLICATIONS FOR
IMMIGRATION REFORM
For the sake of argument, let’s assume
that the goal of our immigration
policy is to promote the economic
interests of U.S. natives. After all, the
interests of natives seems most relevant as a practical matter for governments of countries receiving immigrants and is also commonly thought
to support restrictive immigration
laws. Given the economic theory and
the empirical evidence that I have
reviewed, however, this objective
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would call for more liberal admissions
policies instead.8
If we consider our immigration
laws from the perspective of economics, then the primary problem with
our current admissions policies is
that they are they are unduly restrictive. The United States has made it
too difficult for valuable workers and
taxpayers to enter the United States.
Quotas severely limit the supply of
visas well below the demand for these
visas, creating costly backlogs that
cause immigrants to wait many years
for their visas. As the NRC found, the
older an immigrant is at the time of
entry, the less the immigrant will pay
in taxes over the immigrant’s remaining years in the United States, and the
less favorable the fiscal impact of that
immigrant. So longer backlogs make
not only immigrants but also natives
worse off: Long waiting periods mean
that immigrants enter later in life,
limiting the years during which they
can contribute to our economic welfare by providing labor as workers and
by paying taxes to the public treasury.
When the NRC studied the
economic and fiscal effects of immigration, the NRC economists concluded that immigration produces net
benefits for natives, both in the labor
market and through the public sector.
As I discussed in Part I of this series,
economists estimate that immigrant
workers add billions of dollars per year
to the real income of natives in the
United States by supplying their labor
to our labor market. Furthermore,
immigration also makes us better
off by increasing tax revenues in the
United States. These findings suggest that higher levels of immigration
would produce even bigger benefits

for the U.S. economy. So why not
liberalize our restrictive quotas?
In June 2013, the U.S. Senate took
a promising step in this direction by
passing a comprehensive immigration
reform bill, S. 744, with bipartisan
support. The U.S. House of Representatives, however, has failed to act on
that bill. This bill, also known as the
Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization
Act,9 would not only legalize many
unauthorized immigrants already in
the United States but also would take
several important steps to address the
problem of backlogs in our current
system for legal immigration. For
example, the bill would provide sufficient visas to clear current backlogs
within 7 years.
Unauthorized immigrants given
legal status by the bill would not get
green cards until those backlogs were
eliminated. Legalized immigrants
generally would have to spend 10
years in provisional status and would
go to the back of the line for green
cards, behind those waiting patiently
for their legal immigration visas.
Economists Sherrie Kossoudji and
Deborah Cobb-Clark studied the
wage impacts of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA)
of 1986 and found that the legalization of previously unauthorized
immigrants through IRCA led to an
increase of 6 percent in their wages.10
Citing this research, the Congressional Budget Office predicted that
the Senate bill would increase tax
revenues from these workers and other
immigrants, thereby reducing federal
budget deficits.11
The Senate bill would also treat
spouses and children of lawful per4

manent resident aliens as “immediate
relatives,” which would exempt them
from quotas entirely. Spouses and
minor children of U.S. citizens can
already enter as “immediate relatives”
without any ceilings. The Senate bill
would extend this treatment to the
spouses and minor children of legal
permanent residents. This solution
would give priority to nuclear families
and avoid backlogs for these relatives
without taking immigration visas from
any other categories.
The bill also would eliminate all quotas on the most skilled
employment-based immigrants,
including those with extraordinary
ability, outstanding professors and
researchers, multinational executives
and managers, those with doctorate
degrees, physicians, and workers who
recently received advanced degrees
in science, technology, engineering,
or mathematics (STEM) fields from
universities in the United States.
These STEM immigrants also would
be exempt from labor certification requirements. Furthermore, the
spouses and children of employmentbased immigrants would not count
toward quotas, which would allow
more of these immigrants to enter.
These preference categories already
reserve most employer-sponsored
immigration visas for skilled workers with offers of employment, who
are likely to contribute to the public
treasury by paying income taxes and
unlikely to rely on any means-tested
entitlement programs.12 Thus, liberalizing these admissions is especially
likely to promote the economic welfare of natives.
Our immigration laws also impose
quotas that limit the number of

publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu

immigration visas available to any
one country, and these quotas are
completely insensitive to population
and to the demand for these visas.
The Senate bill would have eliminated
ceilings based on the country of origin
from all employment-based immigrant categories. These per country
quotas have caused especially long
waits for immigrants from China and
India. The Senate bill would allocate
these visas on a country-neutral basis
instead. This reform would be even
better if it also applied to familybased visas, which should also be
available without discrimination based
on national origin.
The Senate bill would also create a
new nonimmigrant V visa for familysponsored immigrants to enter, live in,
and work in the United States while
waiting for approval of their immigration visas. Thus, in the future, backlogs
would not prevent the reunification
of families or delay the contributions
that immigrants can make to our
economy through the labor market or
the public treasury.
Finally, the bill would create
new nonimmigrant visa programs
for less skilled workers: one program
for agricultural visas and another for
other workers. These W visas would
allow workers to enter for a 3-year
period and would be renewable. These
visas would also allow workers within
each category to leave one employer
to work for another employer registered with the program, unlike
past programs which tied each guest
worker to a specific employer. Freedom to leave an employer and to take
employment elsewhere would give
workers greater power to assert their
rights against employers and thereby

prevent abuses, without destroying
the economic gains that natives enjoy
in the labor market from employing
these workers. These visas would give
less skilled workers a legal alternative
to illegal entry and life as an unauthorized immigrant.
From the perspective of the
economic interests of natives, these
guest-worker programs may also be an
effective response to concerns regarding the impact of relatively unskilled
alien workers on the public treasury.
Through such programs, natives
enjoy the benefits of these workers
in the labor market but do not bear
the fiscal burden of providing the
full set of public benefits that these
workers would receive if they had
ready access to permanent residence
and, ultimately, citizenship. Although
immigrants can gain full access to
public benefits upon naturalization,
only aliens “admitted for permanent
residents” may naturalize as U.S.
citizens.13 Alien workers admitted
on nonimmigrant visas only are not
admitted as permanent residents and
are thus not eligible for most public
entitlements and are not eligible
to naturalize.
Our laws generally exclude not
only unauthorized immigrants but
also nonimmigrants, including temporary workers, from a broad range
of public benefits. With only narrow
exceptions, these aliens are ineligible
for “any Federal public benefit.”14
Because guest-worker programs can
give relatively unskilled aliens access
to our labor markets without necessarily providing full access to the benefits
provided to citizens, these programs
may allow the most liberal admissions policies possible for these aliens
5

without imposing a fiscal burden on
natives. I have suggested that such
a program could even accommodate
the desire of some guest workers to
remain by allowing guest workers to
renew their visas for an indefinite
number of multiple periods.15 As
long as the U.S. restricts their access
to public benefits, they seem unlikely
to impose a net fiscal burden on the
public treasury.

THE PATH TO CITIZENSHIP
From the perspective of the interests
of the guest workers, or from the
perspective of principles of justice
in a democracy, the ideal immigration policy would provide the option
of lawful permanent residence and
access to citizenship. To better reflect
democratic ideals, we could offer a
path to citizenship for guest workers
who compile a record of employment
and avoid criminal activity.16 In fact,
under the Senate bill, workers on
W visas could apply for permanent
residence through a merit-based point
system, which would award two points
for each year spent working lawfully
in the United States up to a limit of
20 points. Thus, admission as a guest
worker need not entail permanent
status as an alien.
Would a path to citizenship for
less skilled immigrants raise the
prospect of a fiscal burden? Not
necessarily: by requiring guest workers to spend years in nonimmigrant
status first, we delay their access to
the full set of public benefits that we
provide to citizens. This delay itself
would improve the fiscal impact of
each immigrant. The longer the delay,
the greater the improvement in the

publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu

immigrant’s fiscal impact. The empirical evidence presented by the NRC
suggests that we could allow even
less skilled immigrants to naturalize
without imposing a net fiscal burden
if a sufficient period with limited
access to public benefits has passed.
These observations would apply not
only to guest workers on W visas but
also to family-sponsored immigrants
on V visas or to legalized immigrants
with provisional status. The Senate bill
would allow all of these aliens to work
and pay taxes in the United States
without access to specified public
benefits while seeking permanent
resident status.
In reality, access to citizenship
is a matter of degree. Guest workers
might have the opportunity to adjust
status only after a short period of residence or only after a long period.
We might demand a long work history or impose less stringent requirements. We could choose any point
along this continuum to satisfy critics
concerned about the fiscal impact of
less skilled immigrants. By adjusting
the points a guest worker could earn
through years of work in the United
States and by adjusting the total number of immigrant visas issued through
this point system, we can adjust the

guest worker’s prospects for permanent residence and the number of
years that a guest worker could expect
to wait to adjust status.
In fact, the flexibility of such a
points system is a virtue that might
also facilitate a political compromise
on a path to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants granted legal status.
At least some Republicans in the
House of Representatives expressed
a willingness to grant legal status to
unauthorized immigrants but objected
to the “special” path to citizenship
provided by the Senate bill. A possible
compromise would allow legalized
immigrants to apply for green cards
through the same immigration system
that is open to all prospective immigrants. If Congress were to liberalize
that immigration system enough, so
that enough legalized immigrants
could have a realistic chance of eventually obtaining green cards, then we
could have the makings of a compromise that might finally allow comprehensive immigration reform to emerge
from Congress.

CONCLUSION
The most comprehensive and authoritative study of the fiscal effects of

6

immigration in the United States
finds that immigrants have a net positive effect on the public treasury. These
results, together with the benefits that
immigrant workers confer on natives
in the labor market, suggest that the
economic interests of natives would
be served by more liberal admissions
policies. In particular, the United
States should eliminate or liberalize
the quotas imposed on immigration.
To the extent that the least educated
immigrants may pose some risk of a
fiscal burden, the best response would
be to restrict access to means-tested
public benefits rather than to deny
such immigrants admission. Excluding these immigrants or delaying their
entry needlessly sacrifices the gains
that both natives and immigrants
would enjoy from immigrant participation in the labor market. The comprehensive immigration reform bill
passed by the Senate in 2013 would
have addressed this issue through new
guest worker programs and increases
in legal immigration. Unfortunately,
that effort has stalled in Congress,
and our dysfunctional immigration
system remains badly in need of liberalizing reforms.
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